Search for: All records

Abstract BackgroundThe severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) Omicron variant has spread globally. However, the contribution of community versus household transmission to the overall risk of infection remains unclear. MethodsBetween November 2021 and March 2022, we conducted an active case-finding study in an urban informal settlement with biweekly visits across 1174 households with 3364 residents. Individuals displaying coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)–related symptoms were identified, interviewed along with household contacts, and defined as index and secondary cases based on reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) and symptom onset. ResultsIn 61 households, we detected a total of 94 RT-PCR–positive cases. Of 69 sequenced samples, 67 cases (97.1%) were attributed to the Omicron BA.1* variant. Among 35 of their households, the secondary attack rate was 50.0% (95% confidence interval [CI], 37.0%–63.0%). Women (relative risk [RR], 1.6 [95% CI, .9–2.7]), older individuals (median difference, 15 [95% CI, 2–21] years), and those reporting symptoms (RR, 1.73 [95% CI, 1.0–3.0]) had a significantly increased risk for SARS-CoV-2 secondary infection. Genomic analysis revealed substantial acquisition of viruses from the community even among households with other SARS-CoV-2 infections. After excluding community acquisition, we estimated a household secondary attack rate of 24.2% (95% CI, 11.9%–40.9%). ConclusionsThese findings underscore the ongoing risk of community acquisition of SARS-CoV-2 among households with current infections. The observed high attack rate necessitates swift booster vaccination, rapid testing availability, and therapeutic options to mitigate the severe outcomes of COVID-19. 

Abstract Serological assays used to estimate the prevalence of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) often rely on manufacturers’ cutoffs established on the basis of severe cases. We conducted a household-based serosurvey of 4,677 individuals in Chennai, India, from January to May 2021. Samples were tested for SARS-CoV-2 immunoglobulin G (IgG) antibodies to the spike (S) and nucleocapsid (N) proteins. We calculated seroprevalence, defining seropositivity using manufacturer cutoffs and using a mixture model based on measured IgG level. Using manufacturer cutoffs, there was a 5-fold difference in seroprevalence estimated by each assay. This difference was largely reconciled using the mixture model, with estimated anti-S and anti-N IgG seroprevalence of 64.9% (95% credible interval (CrI): 63.8, 66.0) and 51.5% (95% CrI: 50.2, 52.9), respectively. Age and socioeconomic factors showed inconsistent relationships with anti-S and anti-N IgG seropositivity using manufacturer cutoffs. In the mixture model, age was not associated with seropositivity, and improved household ventilation was associated with lower seropositivity odds. With global vaccine scale-up, the utility of the more stable anti-S IgG assay may be limited due to the inclusion of the S protein in several vaccines. Estimates of SARS-CoV-2 seroprevalence using alternative targets must consider heterogeneity in seroresponse to ensure that seroprevalence is not underestimated and correlates are not misinterpreted.